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COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK

Cubas v. Martinez'
(decided June 7, 2007)
A group of immigrants living in the State of New York challenged a September 6, 2001 Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV")
requirement heightening the standard upon which driver's licenses
may be issued. 2 Under the new requirement, driver's license applicants who are ineligible for a valid social security number ("SSN")
are required to submit immigration documents issued by the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") attesting to their SSN ineligibility. 3 The plaintiffs contended this amounted to an attempt by the
DMV to deny driver's licenses to illegal immigrants, and was essentially a denial of their constitutionally protected right to equal protection under both the United States Constitution4 as well as the New
York State Constitution.5 The New York Court of Appeals found no
1

870 N.E.2d 133 (N.Y. 2007).

2 Cubas, 870 N.E.2d at 135.

3 Id. at 134.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11 states:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or
any subdivision thereof No person shall, because of race, color, creed
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violation and upheld the law. 6
Prior to September 6, 2001, two mandatory prerequisites confronted New York State driver's license applicants: (1) the applicant
was required to "furnish proof of identity, age and fitness as may be
required by the [DMV] commissioner," and (2) the applicant was required to provide a valid and functional social security number.7
However, this did not mean that only individuals with valid SSNs
were eligible to attain a New York State driver's license.8 Rather,
DMV regulations require only that an applicant "submit his or her
social security number or provide proof that he/she is not eligible for
a social security number." 9 Proof of an individual's SSN ineligibility
was made by submission of what is known as an L676 letter from the
DHS (indicating an individual is ineligible for an SSN) to the DMV
with their driver's license application.

°

The new requirements, made

effective on September 6, 2006, required applicants ineligible for
SSNs to provide their underlying DHS documents in addition to the
previously-sufficient L676 letter.1
A trial court agreed with the plaintiffs and issued an injunction, finding the regulation mandating DHS documentation exceeded
the legislative grant of authority to the DMV and violated the bu-

or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights by
any other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the
state or any agency or subdivision of the state.
6 Cubas, 870 N.E.2d at 137.
7 Id. at 135-36 (citing N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 501-02 (McKinney 2008)).

' Id. at 136.
9 Id. (quoting N.Y. COMP.CODES R. & REGS. tit. 15, § 3.9(a) (2007)) (emphasis omitted).
'0 Cubas, 870 N.E.2d at 136.
"

Id at 135.
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reau's own rule-making requirements.

2

The Appellate Division re-

versed and dismissed, finding "the procedures used by the [DMV]
13
Commissioner to be within his authority and enforceable."'

In the subsequent appeal to the New York Court of Appeals,
the plaintiffs conceded the DMV had the right to determine the eligibility of applicants for SSNs, and that the method previously employed for verification, via the L676 letter demonstrating ineligibility,
was also valid.1 4 Instead, the plaintiffs' main contention concerned
the new requirement, that they must submit their DHS documents as
proof of ineligibility.

5

Yet, based upon these concessions, the New

York Court of Appeals refused to find that an applicant who had already submitted DHS documents to the Social Security Administration ("SSA") could not submit these same documents to the DMV.
The court found no indication that individuals would be further burdened under the new requirement. 16 Also, the court found a valid rationale behind the DMV Commissioner's argument that the policy
change was made to pursue the legitimate objective of eliminating
fraudulent L676 submissions. 7

The nexus advanced between the

policy change and the stated objective was the Commissioner's belief
that the DHS documents were more difficult to counterfeit than a
simple publicly-available letter stating an individual was ineligible
12 Id. at 135.

13 Id. See Cubas v. Martinez, 819 N.Y.S.2d 10, 26 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2006).
14 Cubas, 870 N.E.2d at 136. The plaintiffs were entitled as a matter of right to present
their claim to the New York Court of Appeals because the decision of the New York State
Appellate Division was a matter of constitutional interpretation. Id. See also N.Y. C.P.L.R.
5601 (McKinney 2008).
'5 Cubas, 870 N.E.2d at 136.
16 Id. at 137.
'7 Id. at 136-37.
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for SSN. 18
Despite this, the plaintiffs maintained that application of the
new requirement was essentially an act of discrimination against
aliens and undocumented aliens, and amounted to a violation of their
right to equal protection of the law. 19 The court rejected these assertions and held no such issue was presented because the "policy the
plaintiffs challenge is only between applicants who submit L676 letters unaccompanied by the underlying DHS documents, and those
who submit the underlying documents with the letters.,

20

The court

concluded, the "classification of applicants plainly creates no suspect
class, infringes no fundamental right, and raises no serious equal protection questions.,

21

Equal protection of the law is guaranteed under both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,22 as well as by
the New York State Constitution.2 3 These provisions extend protections beyond U.S. citizens, applying to all persons within its borders. 24 As the New York Court of Appeals articulated, "[i]t is axio-

I8

Id. at 136.
137.
Cubas, 870 N.E.2d at 137.
Id. (citing Affronti v. Crosson, 746 N.E.2d 1049, 1052 (N.Y. 2001)).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.The Fourteenth Amendment provides protection against

19 Id. at
20
21
22

state circumscription of federal rights afforded by the Constitution to all persons. Although
states are free to provide greater freedom to their citizens, the Fourteenth Amendment essentially provides that they may not obviate those minimal rights provided for by the United
States Constitution.
23 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 11. Here the New York State Constitution provides
an almost
identical provision to that of the United States Constitution. Article I, section 11 essentially
ensures that the legislature may not circumscribe the freedoms and rights afforded to individuals by the state. It provides equal protection to all persons under the laws of the state.
24 Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1094 (N.Y. 2001) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) ("The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined
to the protection of citizens.")).
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matic that aliens are 'persons' entitled to equal protection.

' 25

The New York State Constitution has an almost identical provision to that found in the Fourteenth Amendment of United States
Constitution, providing, "no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof., 26 As the
New York Court of Appeals made clear in Dorsey v. Stuyvesant
Town Corp.,27 the similarity in language was intentional. "[T]he first
sentence of section 11 'in effect embodies in our Constitution the
provisions of the Federal Constitution which are already binding
upon our State and its agencies.' ,,28 The court noted the consistency
between application of the federal provision in accordance with the
state provision, as seen in previous cases concerning equal protection. 29 For this reason, New York courts look to the standards employed by the federal courts when dealing with equal protection issues.
The New York Court of Appeals, in Cubas, employed a federal standard of review for determining violations of equal protection,
as illustrated by the court's claim that the requirement imposed by the
DMV "plainly creates no suspect class, infringes no fundamental

25

Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1094.

26 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
27 87 N.E. 541 (N.Y. 1949).
28

Id. at 548 (quoting Harry E. Lewis, chairman of the Bill of Rights Comm., New York

State Constitutional Convention of 1938, where article I, section 11 was approved. 2 REV.
RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, APRIL 5, TO

AUGUST 26, 1938 1065 (1938)).
29 Id. ("It is significant that in previous New York cases arising under the Equal Protection
Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions it has not been suggested that the reach of the
latter differed from that of the former.") (citing Kemp v. Rubin, 81 N.E.2d 325 (N.Y. 1948);
Madden v. Queens Co. Jockey Club, 72 N.E.2d 697 (N.Y. 1947)).
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right and raises no serious equal protection questions.,

30

The Cubas

court also cited to Affronti v. Crosson,3 which in turn attributed the
applicable standard to the United States Supreme Court case Nord32

linger v. Hahn.

The Supreme Court, in Nordlinger, gives a brief overview of
the fundamental issues at stake in any equal protection case. 33 "The
Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications.

It simply

keeps governmental decision makers [sic] from treating differently
persons who are in all relevant respects alike.

34

The Court is careful

to recognize that classifications are natural occurrences within the
law, and as such remain permissible so long as they do not overstep
the bounds of the Constitution. Thus, the Court makes clear that,
"unless a classification warrants some form of heightened review because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental right or categorizes on
the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal Protection
Clause requires only that the classification rationally further a legitimate state interest.

35

In Cubas, the Court of Appeals concluded that the classification created by the statute--distinguishing between those who submit
SSA letters and those who submit DHS paper work-is constitutionally permissible because that classification does not trigger any form

30 Cubas, 870 N.E.2d at 137.
31 746 N.E.2d 1049, 1052 (N.Y. 2001).
32 505 U.S. 1 (1992).

33 Nordlinger,505 U.S. at 10.
34 Id.
35 Id.
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of heightened scrutiny, and passes rational basis review. 36 Although
not explicitly stated in the Cubas court's opinion, it appears that the
DMV's purported intent to curb fraudulent L676 submissions through
enactment of the challenged regulation requiring DHS documentation, was a sufficiently "plausible policy reason for the classification., 37 As such, with a rational policy concern as an impetus, the
court seemed content with the conclusion that classification was a
non-issue, and effectively avoided an in-depth discussion as to why
the classification did not create a suspect class or implicate fundamental rights.
While the idea of suspect classification originated in United
States v. CaroleneProducts Co.,38 it was expanded by Korematsu v.
United States.39 In CaroleneProducts,the Court, in its famous footnote, first hinted that some legislation requires a higher form of Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny, especially where "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. 4 0

The Court's

concern was with regard to statutes directed toward minorities of particular religious, national, or racial backgrounds. In Korematsu, the
36 Cubas, 870 N.E.2d at 137.
37 Id. at 137. See Nordlinger,505 U.S. at 11.
38 304 U.S. 144 (1938).

'9 323 U.S. 214 (1944). While this case is now widely criticized for condoning the detention of Japanese Americans in detention facilities during the Second World War, its discussion concerning suspect classes remains relevant today. See Kelly A. MacGrady & John W.
Van Doren, AALS Constitutional Law Panel on Brown, Another Council of Nicaea?, 35

AYRON L. REv. 371, 437 (2002).

40 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
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holding that found the de facto imprisonment of Americans of Japanese descent during World War II constitutional, the Court stated,
"all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject
them to the most rigid scrutiny.,

41

This was the Court's first articula42
tion of what would later become known as "strict scrutiny.,
The nature of suspect classification was expanded again in
Lyng v. Castillo,43 when the Court refused to confer suspect classification to "close relatives," because they "have not been subjected to
discrimination; they do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group; and they
are not a minority or politically powerless.

44

Perhaps more impor-

tantly, the Supreme Court held in Plyler v. Doe45 that aliens are "persons" for purposes of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
of the Federal Constitution.46
The Plyler Court faced the issue of whether Texas violated
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause when it refused reimbursement to local school boards for educating children

41 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
42

Id. (holding strict scrutiny requires the statute be supported by some "[p]ressing public

necessity," or it should be invalidated). See also MacGrady & Van Doren, supra note 40, at
437.
43 477 U.S. 635 (1986).
44 Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638. See Emily S. Pollock, Those Crazy Kids: Providingthe Insanity
Defense in Juvenile Courts, 85 MiNN.L. REV. 2041, 2057-58 n.88 (2001) (discussing the evolution of suspect classification in clarifying that strict scrutiny or "any form of heightened
scrutiny can only be triggered when the person making the claim is a member of a suspect
class").
4' 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
46 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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who entered the country illegally; Texas also sought to impose the
burden of paying tuition for what would otherwise be a free public
education upon those children and their parents.4 7

Although the

Court concluded aliens were a suspect class protected under the
Equal Protection Clause, the Court did find "[u]ndocumented aliens
cannot be treated as a suspect class because their presence in this
country in violation of federal law is not a 'constitutional irrelevancy.' ,48

The Court grounded its reasoning in the voluntariness

with which an individual can move into and out of the classification,
meaning designation as part of the class is not based on an "immutable characteristic.,

49

As the Court explained, "[u]nlike most of the

classifications that we have recognized as suspect, entry into this
class [of illegal aliens], by virtue of entry into this country, is the
product of voluntary action.
crime.,, 50

Indeed, entry into the class is itself a

Thus, depending upon the classification contained in the

statute-whether legal alien versus illegal alien-different standards
of scrutiny may apply.
The plaintiffs in Cubas argued the discrimination at issue in
the statute is against aliens, or undocumented aliens, but the court
ruled the facts of the case did not warrant that conclusion. 5' Viewed
in light of the applicable federal equal protection precedent, the le41 Plyler,457 U.S. at 215-16.
48 Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
49 Id. at 219 n. 19. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (explaining immutable characteristics to be those "determined solely by the accident of birth").
50 Plyler,457 U.S. at 219. Despite this, the Court found the children of these illegal aliens

were a "discrete class ... not accountable for their disabling status." Id. at 223. Furthermore, any negative classification against them would only be constitutional if it "further[ed]

some substantial goal of the State." Id. at 224.
" Cubas, 870 N.E.2d at 137.
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gitimacy of the court's succinct conclusion on the issue presented is
readily apparent.5 2 The plaintiffs conceded the DMV acted permissibly in requiring applicants to provide an L676 letter, and therefore the
court precluded characterization of the provision as one uniquely
burdening aliens, and instead placed it squarely between two classes
the court recognized and precisely articulated:

(1) driver's license

applicants submitting an L676 letter with underlying DHS documentation; and (2) driver's license applicants submitting an identical letter unaccompanied by DHS the documentation.53
The court acknowledged the major significance in the plaintiffs' concession that the DMV acted lawfully in requiring a letter
proving SSN ineligibility, and stated its implication outright:

by

making the concession, the plaintiffs "essentially concede that the
Commissioner need not issue driver's licenses to undocumented
aliens, because undocumented aliens cannot obtain L676 letters
showing that they are ineligible for SSNs. .

.

. [U]ndocumented

aliens lack documents, United States-issued documents at least, and
the DMV's right to insist on such documents is undisputed.

54

Thus,

the court concluded the issue involved a narrow classification, which
did not implicate a "suspect class," and did not implicate fundamental

52

See id.

5 Id. at 136.
They do not challenge the DMV's right to require proof that applicants
are ineligible for SSNs. They admit in their brief that the DMV may
properly verify "possession of a SSN or SSN ineligibility." Indeed, they
concede that the DMV's former requirement for proof of ineligibilityan L676 letter from SSA, saying that the applicant's DHS documents
demonstrate ineligibility for an SSN-was valid.
Id.
54 Id.
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rights, which, in either event, would have raised serious equal protection questions.5 5 The conclusion seems predominately fact-based
given the plaintiffs' early concession of what turned out to be pivotal
facts, and the minimal legal analysis the court extends to justify its
reasoning. Despite this seemingly factual conclusion, it becomes apparent illegal aliens will be denied driver's licenses due to their inability to submit acceptable DHS documentation, and these persons
within this jurisdiction will be denied their supposed equal protection
of the law. Although the issue presents a valid state policy interest,
the avoidance of fraud in the application process for driver's licenses
by aliens residing in this country,56 there is still no mention or any
reason proffered for the broader outcome of this decision: the denial
of driver's licenses to illegal aliens. The court altogether avoids discussion of any viable state interest or rationale as to why it is permissible to deprive illegal aliens of driver's licenses, keeping the analysis
strictly within the narrow purview of the new DMV requirement.
It seems likely, however, that the outcome would have been
different had the plaintiffs not made their early concessions. Fortunately, speculation is unnecessary in this situation because there are
several cases on point with this issue.
Several jurisdictions have already enacted legislation for the
sole purpose of denying illegal aliens driver's licenses. The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia faced this

" Id. at 137.
56 Cubas, 870 N.E.2d at 137. The court makes clear that "[n]othing in the record suggests
that the DMV's concern about fraud is subterfuge." Id. This is a reasonable conclusion
based upon the record's indication of the ease at which these documents can be imitated.
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issue in Doe v. Georgia Department of Public Safety.57 The court
addressed whether Georgia law, which effectively denied driver's licenses to illegal aliens, was violative of equal protection standards.58
The state statute required persons seeking driver's license to be state
residents 59 and added "that no person shall be considered a resident.
. unless such person is either a United States citizen or an alien with
legal authorization from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service.

6°

Although the case was based solely upon an alleged

Fourteenth Amendment violation, the fact Cubas relied almost entirely upon federal precedents means Doe remains instructive.
The court in Doe analyzed the applicable federal case law
concerning equal protection violations.

In recognition of the Su-

preme Court's holding in Plyler, the Doe court recognized that "illegal aliens are not a 'suspect class' that would subject the Georgia
statute to strict scrutiny.",6' The Doe court turned its attention to ascertaining whether the law "should be upheld if it 'mirrors federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state goal.'

,62

The court found sev-

eral legitimate state interests for denying illegal aliens driver's
licenses: preventing the appearance of a legal presence by an alien
via a state issued driver's license; limiting state services to citizens
and legal residents; and a "concern that persons subject to immediate
deportation will not be financially responsible for property damage or

57 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
58 Doe, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1371.

59 Id. at 1372 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-24 (2001)).
60 Doe, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1372 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-15(15) (2001)).
61 Doe, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1372.
62 Id. at 1376 (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225).
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63

The court upheld the

personal injury due to automobile accidents.

state requirements for driver's license applicants, and concluded the
state could constitutionally bar illegal aliens from receiving driver's
licenses. 64
The Iowa Supreme Court decided a matter similar to Cubas in
Sanchez v. State.65 In Sanchez, the plaintiffs argued the state driver's
license application process effectively denied illegal aliens licenses
by requiring social security submissions. 66 While the statute provided a means for authorized foreign nationals to receive driver's licenses, it only lasted the length of their legal stay, but not for a period
longer than two years. 67 The statute further provided that, "[t]o determine whether the applicant is 'authorized to be present,' DOT
[Department of Transportation] regulations require the applicant to
submit one of sixteen immigration documents.,

68

The similarity be-

tween the requirements in Sanchez and Cubas are striking, and just as
in Cubas, the plaintiffs in Sanchez alleged these requirements violated both the United States Constitution and the state constitution of
Iowa. 69 However, the Sanchez court was unable to sidestep the issue

63 Doe, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1376.

64 id.
65 692 N.W.2d 812 (Iowa 2005).
66 Sanchez, 692 N.W.2d at 815 ("Their unauthorized presence in the United States pre-

cludes them from qualifying for a social security number or from obtaining proper immigration documents.").
67 Id. (citing IOWA CODE § 321.196(1) (2006)).
68 See Id. (citing IOWA CODE § 321.196(1) (2003)). See also IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 761601.5(2)(a)(4) 1-16 (2002).
69 Sanchez, 692 N.W.2d at 815, 817. The plaintiffs' Federal Constitutional claims alleged
the provision violated both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 815. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1. Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed their rights under the Iowa State Constitution's
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses were violated. Sanchez, 692 N.W.2d at 817. Ar-
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of driver's licenses being denied to illegal aliens, as was the case in
Cubas.
Initially the Iowa trial court dismissed the case after finding
"illegal aliens ha[d] no right to receive driver's licenses in the State
of Iowa.",70

On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court grappled with

whether the denial of driver's licenses to illegal aliens violated equal
protection. 7 ' In a thoughtful analysis of equal protection, the Iowa
Supreme Court concluded the state did not violate equal protection
rights by denying driver's licenses to illegal aliens.72
The Sanchez court began by accepting federal precedents
concerning equal protection as controlling for the state, and then discussed the evolution of equal protection.73 The court cited City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center in its affirmation that, "[i]f a
statute affects a fundamental right or classifies individuals on the basis of race, alienage, or national origin, it is subjected to strict scrutiny review,, 7 4 which requires the showing of a "compelling state interest.,75 The court recognized the class at issue was not a suspect
class according to Plyler, and as such, strict scrutiny was not war-

title I, section six of the Iowa Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "All laws of a general
nature shall have a uniform operation; the general assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or
class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens." IOWA CONST. art. I, § 6; Sanchez, 692 N.W.2d at 817. Article I, section
nine of the Iowa Constitution states: "[N]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." IOWA CONST. art. I, § 9; Sanchez, 692 N.W.2d at 817.
70 Sanchez, 692 N.W.2d at 815-16.
71 Id. at 814.
72 Id. at 819.
73 Id. at 817 ("Because neither party in this case has argued that our equal protection
analysis under the Iowa Constitution should differ in any way from our analysis under the
Federal Constitution, we decline to apply divergent analyses in this case.").
74 Id. (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)).
75 Sanchez, 692 N.W.2d at 817 (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440).
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ranted.76

469

Rather, the Sanchez court applied rational basis review,

merely requiring the law "be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.,77 The court considered the state's four arguments supporting
a denial of driver's licenses to illegal aliens:
(1) "[N]ot allowing its governmental machinery to be
a facilitator for the concealment of illegal aliens"; (2)
"limiting its services to citizens and legal residents";
(3) "restricting [Iowa] driver's licenses to those who
are citizens or legal residents because of the concern
that persons subject to immediate deportation will not
be financially responsible for property damage or personal injury due to automobile accidents"; and (4) discouragement of illegal immigration.78
Accordingly, the court upheld the statute under rational basis
79

review.

In light of these holdings, it is unnecessary to speculate another outcome in Cubas had the plaintiffs chosen to forego their early
concessions. Even if the plaintiffs had disputed the legality of the
DMV Commissioner's requirements, there are ample rational state
interests to justify the resulting classification.8 ° Perhaps most striking
about Cubas is the court never allowed the discussion to really harp
on the true issue before it: immigration. Although the case presents
itself as an equal protection issue, fundamentally it is nothing more
than an outgrowth of the present immigration debate. It is doubtful

76 Id. at 817.

71 Id. at 817-18 (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440).
78 Id. at 818 (citing Doe, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1376).
71 Id.at

819.

80 See Sanchez, 692 N.W.2d at 819. See also Doe, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1371-76.
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the Court of Appeals failed to recognize this, and more likely it chose
to handle the matter in a manner that efficiently avoided any major
commentary on the immigration debate. The Cubas court's ready acceptance of the plaintiffs' concessions coupled with the artful logic
applied to the facts is perhaps especially indicative of this sort of
skillful avoidance.

The court succinctly, and perhaps wisely, re-

moved the issue from a general denial of driver's licenses to illegal
aliens, to a mere classification issue "between applicants who submit
L676 letters unaccompanied by the underlying DHS documents, and
those who submit the underlying documents with the letters." 81 In
doing so, the court effectively removed the case from the realm of the
politically polarized, and objectively disposes of the issue in a consistent non-partisan manner. 82 In light of the case law, originating in
situations where the immigration issue was more openly addressed,
there is little doubt the case could have turned out another way. It is
clear the denial of state issued driver's licenses to illegal aliens does
not violate the equal protection provisions of either the United States
Constitution, or, as it has been shown, in other state constitutions.
Thus, the inference can safely be drawn that in the company of the
standard state interests for denying illegal aliens driver's licenses, an
outright statutory denial in New York would likely withstand both
federal and state constitutional scrutiny.
Gregory Gillen
81 Cubas, 870 N.E.2d at 137.
82 See Danny Hakim, Spitzer Tries New Tack on Immigrants' Licenses: A Multi-Tiered

System, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2007, at A27 (describing how, in the wake of contentious criticism, former Governor Eliot Spitzer backed off his plan to give illegal immigrants access to
valid New York State drivers licenses).
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